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The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns 
 
Abstract 
Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a 
trivial concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I first situate minimalism 
within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the 
redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is trivial concept but not a property). I then 
outline and appraise two of the primary challenges facing minimalism. Finally, based on this 
discussion, I draw some conclusions concerning the soundness and stability of minimalism. 
 
1. Introduction   
The fundamental thesis of deflationism is that truth is a trivial and transparent concept. If the 
truth predicate has any content, the deflationist claims, it is exhausted by its involvement in some 
version of truth-schema [p] is true iff p (where ‘[p]’ denotes an utterance, sentence or proposition 
and ‘p’ denotes ‘[p]’s object level equivalent). For example, sentential deflationism holds that 
the content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in the disquotational schema ‘p’ 
is true iff p (where ‘p’ is a sentence and ‘p’ is its object level equivalent). On this doctrine, truth 
is defined in English by an infinite list of axioms  
 
(T1) ‘snow is white’ is true iff snow is white,  
(T2) ‘grass is green’ is true iff grass is green,  
 
and correspondingly for all declarative sentences in the language. 
Defined by the triviality thesis, deflationism divides into two main camps according to 
ontological commitment. On strong deflationism, truth is not only a trivial concept but a 
2 
 
redundant one (see Ramsey, ‘Facts and Propositions’; Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic; and 
Strawson, ‘Truth’). On this view, the truth predicate doesn’t designate a property, i.e., there is no 
property of truth. On weak deflationism, while the concept of truth is trivial, it is not redundant 
(cf. Horwich, Truth, ‘A Defense of Minimalism’; Sosa, ‘The Truth of Modest Realism’; Soames, 
‘The Truth About Deflationism’, Understanding Truth; Field, ‘Deflationist Views of Meaning 
and Content’; Gupta, ‘Minimalism’ and ‘A Critique of Deflationism’). Since ‘is true’, it is 
claimed, is logically indispensible, it must designate a property. It is just that the property of 
truth, on this view, is deflated in some sense, e.g., it is not substantial, theoretically important, 
interesting, explanatory, a natural kind or anything in this general vicinity.  
In this paper, the focus will be on the received variant of deflationism, weak deflationism or 
what Horwich calls ‘minimalism’. I first situate minimalism within current deflationary debate 
about truth by pinpointing the primary reasons for its supremacy among deflationists. I then 
outline and appraise two pivotal challenges facing minimalism: its formulation and explanatory 
adequacy. Finally, based on this discussion, I draw some fundamental lessons for the soundness 
and stability of the minimalist conception of truth. 
 
2. Motivations for Minimalism  
At things currently stand, minimalism is the dominant deflationary theory of truth. It is now 
virtually universally acknowledged that the truth predicate, if nothing else, is a denominalizor or 
device of semantic ascent that restores objective reference for certain kinds of expressions by 
permitting one to refer to the objects of one’s attitude in a determinate way. In this respect, the 
truth predicate unquestionably increases the expressive resources of the language: it enables us to 
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formulate certain kinds of statements it would otherwise be impossible to formulate, i.e., 
universal generalizations (e.g., ‘everything Plato claimed is true’) and so-called blind ascriptions 
(e.g., ‘whatever Plato claimed at his first university lecture is true’).  
In view of the logical/expressive indispensability of the truth predicate, the strong deflationist 
must be wrong that the truth predicate is redundant, eliminable or replaceable by some other 
logical mechanism. The inescapable inference is that ‘is true’ functions semantically as a 
predicate―that it designates a property (i.e., a deflated property).  
Numerous commentators including Quine (Philosophy of Logic 11-13), Grover et al. (‘A 
Prosentential Theory of Truth’ 81-6), Gupta (‘Minimalism’ 366-8), Soames (‘The Truth About 
Deflationism’ 247-9), and Horwich (Truth 3) have effectively demolished the redundancy thesis 
underlying the strong deflationary theory of truth (hereafter the ‘redundancy’ theory).1 Since 
‘[p]’ and ‘[p] is true’ are not synonymous or equivalent in terms of cognitive content, it is urged, 
the truth predicate is not redundant or eliminable. Since expressions containing the truth 
predicate cannot be rewritten truth-independently, the reasoning runs, the truth predicate is 
logically indispensable.  
Consider the universal generalization ‘everything Plato claimed is true’. It might be 
reconstructed as ‘for all p, if Plato claimed that p, then p’ or, more specifically, as a long series 
of clauses, one for each potential claim made by Plato: ‘If Plato claimed there is a universal form 
of happiness, there is a universal form of happiness’, ‘If Plato claimed children should be 
educated in mathematics and music, children should be educated in mathematics and music’, and 
so on. The problem with this truth-independent reconstruction is that it is possible to have 
different propositional attitudes towards it and the generalization it reconstructs, implying their 
cognitive inequivalence. As Gupta (‘Minimalism’ 363-5) and Soames (Understanding Truth 
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233-8) have shown, it is possible to believe ‘everything Plato claimed is true’ without believing 
the conjunction of all its instances. While one might believe ‘everything Plato claimed is true’ on 
general grounds (e.g., based on Plato’s character or intellect), one might reject a specific claim 
made by Plato when its content is revealed (e.g., the claim that all children in the ideal republic 
should live separately from their biological parents).  
Next, consider the de facto reconstruction of the blind ascription ‘whatever Plato claimed at 
his first university lecture is true’. Its truth-independent replacement―‘for all p, if Plato claimed 
p in his first university lecture, then p’―suffers from the same basic defect as the reconstructed 
universal generalization. The blind ascription and its truth-independent reconstruction are 
indisputably cognitively inequivalent since it is possible to have different propositional attitudes 
towards them (for the same reasons this is possible in the case of the universal generalization).  
The important point to bear in mind is that a truth predicated universal generalization is not 
cognitively equivalent to the totality of its instances, and a truth predicated blind ascription is not 
cognitively equivalent to a statement (or set of statements) endorsing the actual claim(s) the truth 
predicated ascription is blindly endorsing. Consequently, the redundancy theorist cannot rewrite 
the truth predicated statements using counterfactual schemata of the kind proposed.  
Perhaps, though, the redundancy thesis might be defended via a different reconstruction 
strategy. There appear to be only two options available in this case: rewriting the truth predicated 
statements using (1) ordinary objectual quantification or (2) substitutional quantification.  
Consider the first strategy. In this case, the generalization ‘everything Plato claimed is true’ 
is rewritten as ‘For all x, if Plato claimed x, then x’ via the formula (∀x) (If Plato claimed that x 
→ x). Unfortunately, this truth-independent reconstruction is manifestly incoherent. It is 
generally acknowledged (Black, ‘The Semantic Definition of Truth’ 51-2; Alston, A Realist 
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Conception of Truth 28; Kirkham, Theories of Truth 335-6) to be ill-formed in two distinct ways: 
(a) the second occurrence of ‘x’ would be in an opaque context beyond the reach of normal 
quantification and (b) a variable ranging over objects, specifically, the third occurrence of ‘x’, 
appears in sentential positions. The same problem applies mutatis mutandis to the objectually 
quantified reconstruction of the aforementioned truth predicated blind ascription.  
Next, consider the substitutional quantification strategy for truth-independent reconstruction. 
The reconstruction of the generalization ‘everything Plato claimed is true’ in this case would be 
the same formula as the objectually quantified reconstruction, ‘For all x, if Plato claimed x, then 
x’, except the variables would be interpreted substitutionally instead of objectually―as pro-
sentences instead of as noun phrases referring to objects. Blind ascriptions would be 
reconstructed in an analogous manner.  
One concern with the substitutional quantification strategy is that it furnishes us with a truth-
independent reconstruction only by exploiting a special set of syntactic and semantic rules. The 
substitutional quantifier would doubtless be a cumbersome addition to our language since it 
exploits a new-fangled logical apparatus. The main objection to this strategy, though, concerns 
the explanation of substitutional quantification: substitutional quantification scarcely seems 
intelligible in truth-independent terms (cf. Horwich, Truth 4-5, 25-6; David, Correspondence 
and Disquotation 88-93; McGrath, ‘Weak Deflationism’ 75-7; Kovach, ‘Deflationism and the 
Derivation Game 575-76). For example, in the substitutionally quantified formula ‘For all x, if 
Plato claimed that x → x’, the variable x is associated not with a range of objects but with a 
substitution class of expressions. In interpreting this formula, the most intuitive reading is that 
any result of substituting an English declarative sentence for x in ‘For all x, if Plato claimed that 
x → x’ is true, correct or valid. But rather than eliminate it, truth or some close cognate is 
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featured centrally in this explanation. While the strategy cannot dismissed out of hand, given its 
significant shortcomings, substitutional quantification, like objectual quantification, looks 
unpromising as a mode of truth-independent reconstruction.  
While the supremacy of minimalism among deflationists stems from the implausibility of 
redundancy theses, there is a separate question of the motivation for eschewing inflationism. 
Some of the more well-known reasons for rejecting inflationism in favor of deflationism include 
adherence to the formal simplicity (Horwich, Truth Ch. 2 & 3), ontological purity (Horwich 
(Truth Ch. 4 & 7) and classical interpretation of truth. In respecting these commitments, 
minimalism might be viewed as privileged over inflationary theories of truth such as 
correspondence and epistemic theories that deny truth is a trivial concept and deflated property.2 
 
3. Formulation of Minimalism 
In its most common formulation, the minimalist theory of truth (hereafter ‘MT’) consists of the 
infinite set of non-paradoxical propositions instantiating the equivalence schema (Horwich, 
Truth 6-7, 17-20 and ‘A Defense of Minimalism’ 150-51):3 
 
(E) The proposition that p is true iff p. 
 
This would seem to be the only acceptable formulation of minimalism. The problem is that the 
other two main strategies for formulating minimalism, objectual quantification and substitutional 
quantification, look fundamentally defective.  
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First, minimalism might be formulated as the objectually quantified first order generalization 
(∀x) (if x is a proposition of the form p ↔ p then x is true), which reads ‘For all x, if x is a 
proposition of the form [p if and only if p] then x is true’ (cf. Sosa, ‘The Truth of Modest 
Realism’ 177-95; McGrath, ‘Weak Deflationism’ 73-7). The main concern with this formulation 
of minimalism is analogous to the concern identified (in §2) with objectually quantified truth-
independent generalizations and blind ascriptions. First order generalizations such as ‘For all p, 
the proposition that p is true iff p’, when interpreted objectually, are incoherent or ill formed 
since the two occurrences of the variable ‘p’ refer to different kinds of entities.  
Minimalism, it has been proposed, might be formulated as another kind of objectually 
quantified first order generalization: ‘For all propositions p, p is necessarily equivalent to the 
proposition with respect to it that it is true’ (McGrath, ‘Weak Deflationism’ 76). But this 
approach preserves coherence at the cost of explanatory value. Since necessity and equivalence 
are typically thought best explained in terms of truth, there seem compelling grounds prohibiting 
them from being put to use in formulating minimalism (cf. David, Correspondence and 
Disquotation 88-93; Kovach, ‘Deflationism and the Derivation Game’ 576-7). At the very least, 
until these concepts are shown to be explicable in truth-independent terms, this objectually 
quantified formulation of minimalism must be deemed intolerably circular.  
On the other hand, minimalism might be formulated as the substitutionally quantified first 
order generalization (p)(the proposition that p is true ↔ p), where the universal quantifier is 
interpreted substitutionally rather than objectually, as ranging over classes of expressions (or 
names of objects) instead of objects (e.g., Williams, ‘What is Truth?’ Ch. 3). The formula reads 
‘For each sentence in the language, if we substitute the sentence for the ‘p’ in ‘the proposition 
that p is true ↔ p’, then we produce a true sentence’.  
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This formulation of minimalism suffers two flaws, the second more vexing than the first. (1) 
It seems intolerably circular in the same way as are substitutionally quantified reconstructions of 
truth predicated universal generalizations and blind ascriptions. One is at pains to explain 
substitutional quantification without employing the concept of truth. (2) In the formula (p)(the 
proposition that p is true ↔ p), there are inherent limitations on the substitution class associated 
with the variable ‘p’. Since ‘p’ represents an English sentence, its substitution class must itself be 
a set of English sentences. But English does not have the resources to express every proposition 
that is a candidate to instantiate the equivalence schema.  
In short, while the objections to finite formulations of minimalism are less than definitive, 
they bolster the appeal of Horwich’s infinitistic formulation―MT. And while MT (the infinite, 
irreducible set of T-propositions) is not a uniform theory of truth, this should not be of great 
concern. After all, one of the fundamental theses of minimalism is that truth is not an ordinary 
sort of property, “… a characteristic whose underlying nature will account for its relations to 
other ingredients of reality” (Horwich, Truth 2). And as Horwich points out right at the 
beginning of Truth, this implies that “…unlike most other predicates, ‘is true’ should not be 
expected to participate in some deep theory of that to which it refers―a theory that articulates 
general conditions for its application” (2) (my emphasis). On this plausible view of matters, it is 
no revelation that the only seemingly acceptable ‘formulation’ of minimalism, MT, doesn’t 
really look like a theory of truth. 
 
4. Minimalism and Explanatory Adequacy 
Besides its formulation, there is an important question concerning the explanatory merits of 
minimalism. A touchstone for any proposed theory of truth is its explanatory value, its ability to 
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explain uncontroversial facts or generalizations about truth,4  i.e., to face up to the so-called 
‘generalization problem’ (cf. Armour-Garb, ‘Minimalism, The Generalization Problem and The 
Liar’ 491). For the minimalist, the challenge will be to account for the wide variety of 
generalizations about truth armed only with what Horwich calls the minimalist conception of 
truth, i.e., MT plus theories about the axioms of MT to the effect that they are epistemologically 
and explanatorily fundamental.  
It is commonly maintained, though, that minimalism fails this challenge. Minimalism is 
widely considered explanatorily deficient since it does not contain or imply generalizations about 
truth, including generalizations relating truth to principles of action (e.g., all true beliefs tend to 
engender successful action), to modal principles (e.g., all true statements are possibly true), to 
principles of logic and other principles.  
For example, consider truth’s relationship to the logical principle of closure:  
 
(C) For any propositions p and q, if p is true and p implies q then q is true. 
 
Minimalism does not contain this logical principle since it consists entirely of individual T-
propositions of the form <p> iff p. While minimalism gives us all the instances of (C), it does not 
give us (C) itself. Minimalism does not imply (C) since (C) is not cognitively equivalent to the 
totality of all its instances (Soames, Understanding Truth 247-9; Gupta, ‘Minimalism’ 364).5 A 
universal generalization is not cognitively equivalent to all its instances for reasons already 
discussed, i.e., since it is possible to have different propositional attitudes towards a 
generalization and the set of all its instances.  
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Unsurprisingly, the minimalist has a reply to this kind of objection. Despite appearances, it is 
argued, minimalism needn’t contain or imply any fact about truth since, crucially, the various 
facts about truth do not concern truth per se (Horwich, Truth 47-9). The implication, the 
reasoning runs, is minimalism needn’t explain the facts about truth itself; it need only explain 
them in conjunction with ‘uncontroversial’ external premises.  
While it cannot be dismissed outright, it is highly contentious that truth does not have an 
explanatory role in the traditional sense. The infirmity of this view follows from the failings of 
its attendant explanatory stratagem: minimalism seems unable to explain facts or generalizations 
about truth without employing external premises far from uncontroversial, and seemingly off 
limits to deflationists about truth (cf. Gupta, ‘Minimalism’ 66; Kovach ‘Deflationism and the 
Derivation Game’ 577-9).  
Consider the application of this point to the logical principle of closure (C). The default 
minimalist strategy is to explain (C) on the basis of MT (the infinite set of T-propositions) in 
conjunction with certain other ‘unproblematic’ assumptions derived from logic. Horwich, for his 
part, claims to be able to explain (C) by conjoining MT with the logical principle of entailment 
(Truth 22-4, ‘A Defense of Minimalism’ 156-7):6 
 
(E) All propositions of the form ((p & (p → q)) → q) come out as something like valid or 
correct.  
 
One problem with this strategy concerns Horwich’s use of (E): Horwich cannot help himself 
to this principle if it is best explained in terms of truth. As it happens, though, the received 
explanation of (E) is an alethic one: all propositions of the form ((p & (p → q)) → q) are 
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propositions that emerge as true. Needless to say, unless there is some indication of how (E) 
might be explained in truth-independent terms, the minimalist cannot use it as a premise to 
explain (C).  
 If we have things right, (E) cannot be formulated as the objectually or substitutionally 
quantified generalization ‘for every sentence p and q if p entails q, then if p, then q’ for reasons 
canvassed in §3. Formulating (E) as an objectually quantified generalization produces a formula 
that is either incoherent or relies on a problematic truth-independent notion of necessity and/or 
equivalence. Formulating (E) as a substitutionally quantified generalization produces a formula 
with unduly restricted application that seems intolerably circular. 
The other strategy the minimalist might employ is to explain (E) via an infinitary schema. In 
this case, the principle will be formulated as an infinite list of individual axioms:  
 
(E1) if “Jane lives in Toronto” entails “Jane lives in Canada” then if “Jane lives in Toronto” is 
true “Jane lives in Canada” is true, 
 
(E2)  if “Jane lives in Denver” entails “Jane lives in the United States” then if “Jane lives in 
Denver” is true “Jane lives in the United States” is true,  
 
and correspondingly for each declarative sentence of the language. But for reasons that should 
now be apparent this is not a satisfactory formulation of (E). The problem is that while the 
infinitistic strategy gives us all the instances of (E), it does not give us (E) itself. Since a 
universal generalization is not cognitively equivalent to the totality of its instances, the 
infinitistic formulation neither contains nor implies the universal generalization expressed by (E). 
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Horwich seems to appreciate the gravity of this challenge. In his most recent discussion of 
the generalization problem, Horwich attempts to alleviate these kinds of concerns via a nifty 
gambit. He claims to be able to derive (C) by conjoining minimalism with (E) and an extra 
explanatory premise concerning our brute dispositions to accept generalizations based on our 
acceptance of all their instances:   
(D) Whenever someone can establish, for any F, that it is G, and recognizes that he can do this, then 
he will conclude that every F is G (‘A Defense of Minimalism’ 157) (Horwich’s emphasis).7 
For Horwich, assuming we are inclined to accept the axioms of MT, we can establish, for 
instance, that for any given conjunction F, that it is true only if its conjuncts are G, and as long as 
our ability to do so proceeds in this way, we can recognize we can do so (‘A Defense of 
Minimalism’ note 20). Granting (D), it follows that we will be predisposed to conclude that 
every conjunction is true if and only if its conjuncts are true (cf. Armour-Garb, ‘Minimalism, 
The Generalization Problem and The Liar’ 495-6). The same account, according to Horwich, can 
be given mutatis mutandis for any generalization about truth.8 
I think this kind of strategy holds little promise. Notoriously, there are inexorable difficulties 
plaguing dispositional semantic analyses, analyses employing dispositions as reductive 
explanans for semantic notions. The main concern with Horwich’s dispositionalist proposal is 
that it is not clear exactly what sets of dispositions are. Evidently, sets of dispositions (or 
patterns of sets of dispositions) are not natural kinds since dispositions ipso facto do not stand in 
explanatory or structural relations to one another. Indeed, it seems the question of what structural 
relations sets of dispositions bear to one another  is really a meta-level question; if Collins is 
correct (‘On the Proposed Exhaustion of Truth’ 672-3), it can only be addressed at the level of 
theories of semantic competence―theories concerning the preconditions for learning and 
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understanding the meanings of expressions. But in this case the appeal to dispositions would be 
superfluous since the theory of semantic competence would be doing all the explanatory work.  
 In spite of this, given the obscurity of the relevant issues, charitability might be in order in 
this case. The crucial point is even granting there is a truth-independent formulation of (E) and 
other required principles doesn’t appear to rescue minimalism’s explanatory prospects. 
Permitting the minimalist to invoke (E) and numerous other external principles in explaining 
facts about truth effectively weakens the ‘adequacy thesis’. In particular, it is mysterious in this 
case what role the minimalist conception of truth is playing in explaining the facts at issue. 
Insofar as the principles of minimalism―the T-propositions―are axioms of any acceptable 
theory of (propositional) truth, the ‘unproblematic’ external principles such as (E) seem to be 
doing all the explanatory work. Since (E), in this case, is consistent with and follows from any 
proposed theory of (propositional) truth, minimalism’s explanation of (C) is manifestly bankrupt. 
As a matter of course, any theory of truth, indeed any theory, can explain the ‘facts about truth’ 
in this manner, implying minimalism collapses into an absurdly trivial theory of truth with no 
axioms whatsoever, what Gupta calls the ‘null theory of truth’ (‘Minimalism’ 364).   
There is a related, potentially equally serious problem concerning the explanatory value of 
minimalism. In explaining the so-called facts about truth in the proposed manner, minimalism 
must necessarily exploit a wide range of external principles/concepts/axioms/etc. Since there is 
no reason to think any such principle is explicable in terms of or reducible to a smaller set of 
more fundamental ones, there is no upper limit on the amount of principles that would need to be 
stipulated to sustain the ‘adequacy thesis’. From this perspective, it is less than compelling that 
one of the professed aims of minimalism is realized―the deliverance of a simple or pure theory 
of truth.  
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Naturally, there are manifold ways to evaluate the simplicity of a theory. On ontological 
grounds, minimalism might be deemed a simple theory since it entails the purity of truth, i.e., 
that truth is a property with ‘no underlying connections to other ingredients of reality’. But there 
is a broader, more illuminating perspective from which minimalism seems to falls short on the 
simplicity metric. From what has been called an ‘ideological’ perspective (Gupta, ‘Minimalism’ 
365-6), minimalism seems to be a maximally complex theory (cf. also O’Leary-Hawthorne and 
Oppy, ‘Minimalism and Truth’ 179 & 193; David, Correspondence and Disquotation 126-9). 
First, minimalism is irreducible, i.e., it requires a separate biconditional for each proposition. 
Second, for this reason, external principles will be required to explain the facts about truth, and 
there is no real way of knowing how many will be needed. It turns out, then, minimalism 
ultimately must contain all concepts and subsume the ideology of all theories. The upshot, if 
Gupta is right, is that even if minimalism were explanatorily adequate, “… it would be natural to 
be dissatisfied with it and to seek a simpler theory, a theory that explains the phenomena in a 
more economical fashion” (‘Minimalism’ 365).    
While minimalism is formulatable, it seems to founder on the criterion of explanatory 
adequacy. Explaining the facts about truth requires the minimalist to exploit external principles 
that are far from uncontroversial, principles seemingly inexplicable in truth-independent terms. 
This verdict is buttressed by the recognition that permitting the use of these principles effectively 
weakens the adequacy thesis and correspondingly reduces minimalism to an absurdly trivial 
theory of truth. The unsoundness of minimalism seems to stem, on the flip side, from the insight 
that even granting minimalism’s explanatory completeness, a strong case can be made that 
minimalism is, contra Horwich, a strikingly complex theory.   
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5. Conclusion: Minimalism and the Instability Concern 
If we are correct, minimalism isn’t formulatable in finite terms. The only viable formulation of 
minimalism is MT: the infinite set of non-paradoxical instantiations of the equivalence schema. 
But since minimalism denies truth has an underlying nature the minimalist is scarcely required to 
formulate her theory of truth in a uniform manner.  
On the other hand, there are serious questions about the explanatory merits of minimalism. 
The previous section’s discussion suggests minimalism is explanatorily inadequate. The problem 
is minimalism is unable to explain putative uncontroversial facts about truth, either via infinitary 
schemas or finite formulas.  
The putative explanatory deficiencies of minimalism seem to portend its instability. 
Minimalism’s inability to explain uncontroversial facts about truth, it can be argued, imply its 
view of truth is fundamentally equivocal, i.e., that it threatens to collapse into either that of 
strong deflationism or some form of inflationism.  
Among others, Boghossian (‘The Status of Content’), Wright (Truth and Objectivity, 
‘Response to Commentators’), and O’Leary-Hawthorne & Oppy (‘Minimalism and Truth’ 184) 
have developed variants of this basic kind of instability objection (although O’Leary-Hawthorne 
and Oppy suspend judgment on it). On this view of matters, there is no middle road when it 
comes to the ontological character of truth: either truth is a property in which case ‘is true’ is 
amenable to explicit analysis or truth is not a property in which case ‘is true’ is not amenable to 
explicit analysis. The attempt to draw a line between a minimal and non-minimal property of 
truth, it is claimed, requires the employment of a non-minimal concept of truth or of something 
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which relies on such a conception. There is also a related concern that minimalism cannot both 
be a complete and consistent theory of truth due to the existence of liar-like propositions and set-
theoretic paradoxes (cf. Armour-Garb, ‘Minimalism, The Generalization Problem and The Liar’ 
496-7; Lindström, ‘Horwich’s Minimalist Conception of Truth: Some Logical Difficulties’ 174-
8; Grim, The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge and Truth Ch. 4; Greimann, ‘Explicating 
Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism’), a concern I will not pursue here.    
In the postscript to Truth, Horwich attempts to subdue instability concerns of this 
form by emending the minimalist conception of truth, i.e., its conception of the property 
of truth. According to Horwich, minimalism does not in itself answer the question of 
whether or not truth is a property, but does so only in conjunction with particular 
conceptions of property:  
Minimalism does not involve, in itself, any particular answer to this question. For it may be 
combined with a variety of different conceptions of property, some of which will yield the 
conclusion that the truth predicate does stand for a property, and some that it doesn’t. (141) 
On first blush, though, this line of reply seems to obscure the instability objection rather than 
confront it. Horwich’s strategy involves exploiting a bipartite, vacillating conception of the 
property of truth: depending on which view of property is operative, minimalism implies either 
(a) that truth is a deflated property or (b) that truth is not a property. But it is exactly the 
bifurcation premise underlying minimalism that seems to give rise to the instability conundrum. 
The problem evidently is that on (a) minimalism is committed to truth being a deflated property 
of some kind in which case it is still susceptible to the instability dilemma, and on (b) 
minimalism is committed to there being no property of truth in which case it collapses into 
strong deflationism.  
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The quandary can be framed in other terms. If the minimalist denies there are facts about 
truth requiring explanation as such, minimalism effectively devolves into the implausible 
redundancy theory of truth according to which the truth predicate is redundant and doesn’t 
designate a property. If, on the other hand, the minimalist acknowledges there are facts about 
truth requiring explanation as such, minimalism effectively evolves into some form of 
inflationism according to which truth is an inflated property of truth bearers (a property with a 
genuine explanatory role).   
Naturally, this is not the final word on the explanatory merits and/or stability of minimalism. 
But doubtless minimalism incurs significant, often unacknowledged, commitments concerning 
the dichotomous nature of concepts (that there is a distinction between trivial-redundant concepts 
and trivial-non-redundant concepts), predicates (that there is a distinction between predicates that 
express properties and those that don’t) and properties (that there is a distinction between 
natural/non-natural, explanatory/non-explanatory properties) (cf. O’Leary-Hawthorne and Oppy,  
‘Minimalism and Truth’ 178-9). In the absence of a more robust defense of this implicit 
ideology, minimalism looks just as unsound as its strong deflationary counterpart. At the very 
least, there are considerable theoretical obligations the minimalist has yet to discharge. 
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Notes 
 
1 Unlike the rest of this group, Grover et al. reject the redundancy thesis yet maintain truth does not have a property-
ascribing role (‘A Prosentential Theory of Truth’ 83). Grover et al.’s prosentential theory of truth will not be 
discussed in this paper.  
 
2 The epistemic theory of truth is considered particularly problematic in this case since it compels the abandonment 
of classical logic. 
 
3 Needless to say, unprincipled restriction to the non-paradoxical is notoriously problematic. See Soames 
(Understanding Deflationism) and Armour-Garb (‘Minimalism, the Generalization Problem and the Liar’) for an 
illuminating discussion of this concern. 
 
4 For precision, generalizations about truth need to be distinguished from generalizations involving truth. 
Generalizations involving truth are generalizations in which the truth predicate participates, generalizations such as 
‘Everything claimed by Plato is true’ or ‘It is true that all red objects are colored objects’. Generalizations about 
truth, on the other hand, are generalizations that apply to all truth bearers (examples to follow in the text). 
 
5Curiously, Soames frames this point in terms of logical equivalence (Understanding Truth 247): “...universal 
generalizations are not logical consequences of the set of all their instances”. Soames’ thesis vis-à-vis the logical 
inequivalence of universal generalizations and the set of all their instances might be correct but, unlike the 
‘cognitive inequivalence thesis’, seems controversial. Moreover, the cognitive inequivalence thesis is sufficient to 
support our argument in this case. If the cognitive content of universal generalizations and the set of all their 
instances diverges then minimalism’s infinitary schematic definition of truth does not imply or explain universal 
generalizations about truth such as (C).      
6 I will not rehearse the specific details of the derivation here. Suffice it to say Horwich attempts to produce a valid 
argument with the principle of entailment and minimalism as its premises and the principle of closure as its 
conclusion. 
 
7 Cf. also Meaning for Horwich’s dispositional analysis of truth generalizations and other truth-predicated 
statements. 
   
8 Field (‘Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content’ 249-85) offers a similar solution to the generalization 
problem. 
